News
12 JUL - AAIB re-states recommendations on flight control restriction events in winter op 13 JUL - Public attitudes, perceptions and behaviours towards cabin safety communications
20 JUL - NTSB recommends MSAW system changes to prevent CFIT accidents
22 JUL - FAA grounds American Flight Group and Fines Medway Air Ambulance
26 JUL - NTSB issues recommendation on aging aircraft inspections and record reviews
28 JUL - ICAO audit questions readiness of new Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi Airport
28 JUL - Loss of situational awareness in hailstorm quoted as cause for Peruvian 737 cras
29 JUL - Small cracks caused landing gear on JAS MD-81 to break in 2004 accident
12 JUL 2006 AAIB re-states recommendations on flight control restriction events in winter op [to table of contents]
The UK AAIB again reported several occurrences of flight control restrictions experienced on aircraft with non-powered flying controls. These events were believed to have been caused by the freezing of the rehydrated residues of thickened de/anti-icing fluids, that had accumulated in the aerodynamically ‘quiet’ areas of the elevator and aileron controls. Numerous occurrences were already published in April 2006 by the AAIB. The AAIB has repeatedly expressed its concerns to the UK CAA, the JAA and EASA, that effective measures to address the airworthiness concerns posed by the residues of thickened de/anti-icing fluid have yet to be implemented an re-states the safety recommendations made in April. (AAIB)
AAIB Bulletin 7/2006
The ATSB released the findings of a study that provided an overview of aircraft cabin safety communications in Australia, in terms of effectiveness, passenger attitudes to such communications and opportunities that exist for improvement. Most passengers agreed that paying attention to cabin safety communications is important. However, results revealed that behaviours do not always match this perception. Perceived relevance of safety information and frequency of travel were found to be significant factors affecting passenger attitudes and behaviours. High levels of message recognition, combined with excessive levels of confidence in personal ability to perform safety actions may be key drivers of reduced perceptions of relevance. Passenger attention levels to safety communications were found to be generally low. Of all communication types tested, the safety briefing was most prone to perceptions of reduced relevance through repeated exposure, while very low attention levels and perceptions of content establish safety cards as being generally ineffective. Analysis identified that low levels of passenger attention to safety communications results from overconfidence, superficial familiarity with messages, issues relating to the way safety content is presented, perceptions of substitutability between the card and briefing and social norms present in the aircraft cabin. A framework for cognitive processing of cabin safety communications is presented. The framework identifies that passenger behaviours may be negatively influenced by perceptions that it is socially undesirable to pay attention to safety information. Changing normative and attitudinal beliefs represents the greatest opportunity to improve communication effectiveness. Key opportunities are identified to improve cabin safety through enhancement of communications. These recommendations include tailoring communications to the needs of specific passenger profiles, providing additional information to passengers, improved design guidelines, regular content variation and use of communications specialists in safety media design. (ATSB)
ATSB Research and Analysis Report B20040238
20 JUL 2006 NTSB recommends MSAW system changes to prevent CFIT accidents [to table of contents] The NTSB has investigated 11 aircraft accidents (10 CFIT) that have caused serious concern about the effectiveness of the FAA`s methods of ensuring that air traffic controllers detect and properly respond to imminently hazardous situations. Four recommendations are issued, intended to improve safety of flight through changes to the minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) and conflict alert systems used to direct controller attention to CFIT hazards or impending collision and to FAA air traffic control (ATC) training. (NTSB)
NTSB safety recommendations A06-44/47
22 JUL 2006 FAA grounds American Flight Group and Fines Medway Air Ambulance [to table of contents] The FAA has revoked the air carrier certificate of American Flight Group, Inc. (AFG). In a related case, the FAA and Medway Air Ambulance have reached a settlement agreement that calls for Medway to pay a civil penalty of $1,000,000, for operating as an air carrier without an air carrier certificate, in violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations. In an Emergency Order of Revocation issued to AFG on May 19, 2006, the FAA determined that AFG allowed other companies that did not hold air carrier certificates or did not have sufficient authority under their own certificates to operate flights for hire under the AFG certificate. The FAA found that AFG permitted these other companies to list their aircraft on AFG`s operations specifications for a fixed monthly fee. These other companies, not AFG, then exercised operational control over the flights and the flight crewmembers, in violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations. Although AFG appealed the revocation order to the National Transportation Safety Board, AFG withdrew that appeal, which means that the order issued by the FAA is final. The settlement with Medway was reached after the FAA issued an Emergency Cease and Desist Order requiring the company to cease its illegal operations. The FAA determined that Medway entered into agreements with AFG that allowed Medway's aircraft to operate under AFG's certificate for a monthly fee. However, Medway, not AFG, was exercising operational control over those flights. (FAA)
press release
26 JUL 2006 NTSB issues recommendation on aging aircraft inspections and record reviews [to table of contents] In the light of their preliminary findings regarding the Grumman G-73 Turbo Mallard crash at Miami last year, the NTSB issued a safety recommendation to the FAA. It states: `Require records reviews, aging airplane inspections, and supplemental inspections for all airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, all U.S.-registered airplanes operated under 14 CFR Part 129, and all airplanes used in scheduled operations under 14 CFR Part 135. This would include those airplanes operated under Part 135 that carry nine or fewer passengers and those that are operated in scheduled cargo service.` The FAA has been working on a final rule for aging airplanes for several years. The Safety Board however is concerned that the exemptions iterated in this final rule exclude airplanes such as the accident airplane that was being operated under 14 CFR Part 121 because it was type-certificated before January 1, 1958. The Safety Board also notes that the exemptions present in the final rule are contrary to the one-level-of-safety initiative that the FAA concluded in the mid 1990s, which required all commercial aircraft in scheduled passenger service having 10 or more seats to meet Part 121 requirements. (NTSB)
NTSB safety recommendations A06-52
28 JUL 2006 ICAO audit questions readiness of new Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi Airport [to table of contents] The ICAO has questioned the readiness of Bangkok`s new Suvarnabhumi Airport for its official opening on Sept 28. The ICAO report, based on its information collected and observations made between last month and early this month, identifies 29 high-risk areas - or about one-third of the 93 items on its checklist. Among the high-risk items identified by the ICAO in its report are the airfield visual aides including taxiway, apron and airside road signs, lights and markings. Failure to address them could lead to unsafe ground operations which `may contribute to an aircraft incident or accident`, the report says. The airport and Aviation Department are confident that all problems identified would be fixed in time for the official opening. (Bangkok Post) 28 JUL 2006 Loss of situational awareness in hailstorm quoted as cause for Peruvian 737 cras [to table of contents]
According to the Peruvian accident investigators, the August 2005 accident involving a TANS Boeing 737 near Pucallpa was caused by a loss of situational awareness in a severe hailstorm on approach to Pucallpa. The flight crew failed to abort the unstabilized approach and continued their fast descent despite the GPWS warnings and the severe storm that they were penetrating. It also appeared that a copilot under instruction was in the right hand seat while the regular copilot was in the passenger cabin at the time of the accident. (CIAA) 29 JUL 2006 Small cracks caused landing gear on JAS MD-81 to break in 2004 accident [to table of contents]
Small cracks that were overlooked by mechanics during inspections caused the main landing gear of a Japan Air System (JAS) MD-81 to break when it landed at Tokunoshima Airport (TKN) on January 1, 2004, according to the investigation report released by the ARAIC. Three cracks were found, believed to be the starting points of the break. Inspectors suspect that the cracks, measuring between 3 and 5.2 millimeters long, developed as a result of metal fatigue. The committee concluded that cracks probably developed as a result of stresses generated during a gear walk (serious fore and aft oscillations of the gear) before restrictor plates were installed. (Mainichi)
Report AA2006-3
